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NAFTAAND 
MEXICAN NATIONALISM 
Amy Gard 
Introduction 
In 1991 President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari of Mexico proposed an agreement to 
eliminate the trade barriers between the United 
States and Mexico. In the United States, trade 
dependent groups have embraced the idea; but 
others, such as environmental groups, have 
opposed the plan. Interested groups have 
spread confusion, distortions, and false assump-
tions regarding such a free-trade agreement. 
Some Americans worry that their factories will 
be shut down and, hence, that many of their 
jobs will head south. In Mexico, however, both 
the well-to-do and impoverished alike hope that 
the agreement will produce an economic boom 
that will catapult their country from the Third 
World to the First World. The reality is that a 
free-trade agreement will not change anyone's 
life overnight. Regardless of the pace involved, 
change will occur in both the economic and 
social sectors of the countries involved in the 
agreement. 
Since 1821, relations between the United 
States and Mexico have ranged from passive 
hostility to armed intervention. Although both 
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countries now project an image of neighborly 
concern and affection for each other, feelings of 
resentment and hostility remain, especially 
south of the Rio Grande. Ironically, the free-
trade pact will push two historically uneasy 
neighbors into a permanent embrace and will 
drive their two cultures closer than ever before. 
In this paper I will examine how a North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will 
affect Mexico. Specifically, I will explain how 
Mexico's nationalism will be influenced by a 
free-trade pact. In order to better understand 
Mexico's nationalism, I will explore its histori-
cal unfolding. Through a few key examples of 
foreign intervention and domination, I hope to 
illustrate how and why this nationalistic senti-
ment developed and how it will be influenced 
by NAFTA. 
Mexican Nationalism 
Mexico's prominent and even aggressive 
sense of nationalism provides an interesting 
backdrop to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Why would a country so histori-
cally beset by attacks, invasions, and occupa-
tions want to enter into an agreement with a 
country that it mistrusts and often fears? 
Mexicans and Americans can look to Salinas for 
their answer. One journalist from the Boston 
Sunday Globe believes that Mexico has done an 
about-face since Salinas took office on 
December 1, 1988. (Smith, 1992) The Mexican 
president has reduced inflation, has attacked 
corruption, and has sold several state-owned 
enterprises, such as Petroleos Mexicanos 
(Pemex) and the Bank of Mexico, in order to 
reduce the national debt. His aim is to make 
Mexico part of the First World and to spur its 
economic growth and development. Salinas 
believes that NAFTA will be a means of bring-
ing together Mexican labor with the technolo-
gy of the U.S. Together, he feels that the two 
countries can unite and create a formidable 
partnership. 
One has to wonder, though, how the 
Mexican national identity will be affected by a 
free-trade agreement. Blockbuster Video out-
lets, Burger Kings, and Nikes have already infil-
trated Mexican culture. Consequently, many 
Mexicans fear that the treaty will turn Mexico 
into another "American state." (Guillermopri-
eto, p. 60) In order to understand the fear of 
losing one's cultural heritage, it is necessary to 
analyze the rise and importance of Mexican 
nationalism. 
Nationalism, according to Webster$, is 
loyalty and devotion to a nation; it is exalting 
one nation above all others and placing prima-
ry emphasis on promotion of its culture and 
interests. (Webster$ Dictionary of English 
Usage, 1989) Furthermore, some believe that 
nationalism has been responsible for promot-
ing xenophobic and isolationist feelings. For 
instance, since the loss of half its territory to 
the United States in 1848, Mexico's nationalism 
is in part anti-Americanism. 
One explanation for Mexico's strong sense 
of nationalism is that honor and glory must be 
extracted from its embarrassing defeats. The 
threats and invasions that have come from 
abroad seem to justify what some would call 
Mexico's xenophobic tendencies. Mexico still 
feels vulnerable. Nationalism disguises any 
internal doubts while still maintaining an 
image of external confidence to the world. 
Some have claimed that Mexico's nationalism 
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is more of a survival mechanism than an ideol-
ogy. (Riding, p. 19) Whatever the reasons for 
the Mexican sense of pride, previous govern-
ments have used their country's patriotism to 
unite the nation. In the 1980s, for example, 
President de la Madrid ordered that the nation-
al anthem be played every night on the radio to 
bolster national pride during severe economic 
times. (Riding, p. 19) 
Historical Background 
Mexico's complex history is part of every 
child's education and is a conscious part of his 
or her Mexican soul. Mexicans differ from 
Americans, Europeans, and other Latin 
Americans. They are a nation which is "inhab-
ited by a number of races speaking different lan-
guages and living on different historical levels." 
(Paz, p. 11r They are proud of their rich her-
itage which can be traced back to the 
Teotihuacans, who at the beginning of the 
Christian era constructed the mighty pyramids 
of the Sun and the Moon and had a highly 
developed artistry and an intensive canal sys-
tem that provided irrigation for the entire civ-
ilization. Mexicans also proudly recall the 
Toltec empire, which took advantage of the 
weakened Teotihuacan empire and dominated 
the Valley of Mexico in the region of Topiltzin-
Quetzalcoatl. (Keen and Wasserman, p. 18) 
Internal pressures caused the fall of Tula in 
1224, which permitted the entry of groups 
known collectively as Chichimecs, of whom the 
Aztecs were part. 
The Aztecs 
Today Mexicans correctly consider the 
Aztecs a major source of Mexican identity in 
their society. Tenochtitlan, the amazing Aztec 
city which began construction in 1344, is the 
ancestor of Mexico City, the largest metropolis 
in the world. The Aztecs achieved indepen-
dence in 1428 and, with the city-state of 
Texcoco and the smaller town of Tlacopan, 
formed a Triple Alliance which controlled much 
of middle America. Mexican nationalism is pro-
Aztec and anti-Spanish, partly because most 
modern Mexicans descend from indigenous 
peoples and partly because the Spanish inva-
sion was the first of a series of humiliating for-
eign intrusions. 
In 1519 Fernando Cortes and approx-
imately 500 other Spanish soldiers of fortune 
initiated one of the most dramatic events in 
world history. Navigating the Gulf coast of 
Mexico, either befriending or slaughtering the 
natives there, they reached what is now known 
as San Juan de Ulua, where Cortes realized that 
the natives would report what they saw to 
Moctezuma (most Americans know him as 
Montezuma). Later Cortes told the local chief 
to tell Moctezuma that "the Spaniards had a 
disease of the heart which could be cured only 
by gold." (Meyer and Sherman, p. 103) By skill-
ful diplomacy and measured duplicity, Cortes 
led his men across Mexico. 
Conquest of Mexico 
Over the next two years, the Spaniards 
subjugated Mexico and its native inhabitants. 
The Aztecs were dominated and exploited by 
foreigners, which provides a basis for the mod-
ern Mexican's fear of being controlled by the 
United States. 
As the people of Mexico saw themselves 
controlled and manipulated by Spaniards and 
their religious and ideological beliefs mocked 
and forbidden, resentment festered. European 
values were forced upon natives who rebelled 
in such episodes as the Mixton War of 1541. 
But no act of native resistance was ever more 
than temporarily successful. European disci-
pline, technology, and cohesion determined the 
outcome. Devastating diseases such as small-
pox and typhus decimated Mexican society and 
convinced them that Spanish soldiers, who had 
natural immunity, were superior. 
Society in Mexico soon became composed 
of two basic ethnic groups in the 1500s: Spanish 
and Indian. Because Spanish males outnum-
bered females by 10-1, miscegenation occurred. 
Offspring produced by this mixed blood were 
called mestizos. Different ethnic mestizos often 
produced children with even more varied 
appearances. Hence, racial and cultural traits 
became extremely confused and dramatically 
interwoven. In rural areas, where Indians pre-
dominated, society changed relatively little; and 
many of these natives had not been acculturat-
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ed into Spanish ways. Those who lived closer to 
the Spanish cities, however, took on many 
"white" characteristics. 
The elite of this new society was made up 
of the two thousand Spaniards living in Mexico 
in 1521. (Meyer and Sherman, p. 204) These 
conquerors and first settlers of the colony 
thought themselves entitled to positions of 
power and authority. However, since many of 
these "lords of Mexico" came from humble ori-
gins in Spain, the crown preferred European-
born Spaniards of nobility for positions of 
authority. The second level of the hierarchy in 
colonial society was formed by those of Spanish 
blood born in Mexico. These creoles felt iden-
tical to peninsulares (Spaniards), but the fact 
that they were not born in the home country 
diminished their relative status, as did the sus-
picion that many had an Indian ancestor or two. 
The repressed feelings of this class comprised 
the most deepseated tensions afflicting the colo-
nial society (Leonard, p. 42), an ethnic-politi-
cal-racial hostility that led to the expulsion of 
Spanish soldiers in 1821 and secession from the 
Spanish empire. Creoles were considered supe-
rior to both the darker-skinned mestizos and 
the shrinking population of Indians who made 
up the lower two rungs in the social hierarchy. 
The extreme wealth of the upper classes 
was in sharp contrast to the majority of colo-
nial Mexicans who lived in poverty. Wages of 
rural and urban workers were appalling, allow-
ing for only the barest necessities. Indians were 
subject to forced labor, including systems of 
encomienda and repartimiento, with little or 
no recourse available. 1 Furthermore, the 
Indians were forced to pay tribute to the crown, 
a symbol of their inferior status, and were for-
bidden to wear European clothing. This caused 
humiliation and alienation. Consequently, a 
1Spaniards were often granted control of Mexican vil-
lages as a reward for their support of the crown. This sys-
tem, the encomienda, insured that the deserving Spaniard 
received the free labor of the natives. In return, the natives 
were placed in the foreigner's care. (Meyer and Sherman, 
p. 131) 
In order to maintain the splendor of the cities, a system 
of forced labor called the repartimiento was developed. 
Under this system each adult male Indian was forced to con-
tribute forty-five days of labor a year to the crown. (Meyer 
and Sherman, p. 170) 
profound feeling of bitterness was held by most 
native Mexicans who saw "whites" as manipu-
lative. (Meyer and Sherman, p. 27 4) Such feel-
ings of hatred could only have added to the anti-
foreign sentiment brewing within Mexico. 
Fight for Independence 
There were over a hundred conspiracies 
and rebellions against Spanish domination in 
Mexico between 1521 and 1854. (Meyer and 
Sherman, p. 278) Some were threats to Spain's 
power, while others were rather trivial in 
nature. In order to squelch yet another revolt 
for independence, King Ferdinand VII of Spain 
assembled a powerful army for service in South 
America in 1820. While preparing to fight for 
Ferdinand, a Spanish colonel and his troops 
revolted against him and demanded freedom 
from his tyrannical rule. When the creoles in 
Mexico heard that the King had yielded to this 
demand, many wanted to revolt as well. Despite 
Ferdinand's attempts to squelch the uprisings, 
later that summer Agustin de Iturbide (a cre-
ole) became head of the new government, and 
made himself Emperor Agustin I. 
Once the initial euphoria of independence 
had ended, it became evident that 300 hundred 
years of Spanish rule had done little to prepare 
the colony for freedom. Mexico had no sense 
of nationalism. Disparate groups in society 
such as the Church, the army, the landlords, 
and the political factions had little in common. 
Their private concerns outweighed any sense of 
national interest they may have felt. Moreover, 
the new nation was controlled by weak local 
governments. Provincial warlords, or caciques, 
emerged and began to run their regions much 
like that of the rulers of the city-states under 
the Aztec empire. The caciques owed formal 
allegiance to the central authority in Mexico 
City; but when taxation or other demands 
became too steep, they simply rebelled. 
Problems in Texas and the War with 
the United States 
Problems also plagued Mexico in its terri-
tories. For example, Mexican control was weak-
ening in the Mexican province of Texas where 
antagonism was growing between the Mexicans 
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and the Texans. The Texans wanted a greater 
voice in their government while the Mexicans 
feared that the U.S. government would secure 
the area for itself. In order to remedy the situa-
tion, President Guerrero designed the coloniza-
tion law of 1830. (Meyer and Sherman, p. 337) 
This law forbade all future immigration from 
the United States into Texas and called for 
improved economic ties between Texas and the 
rest of Mexico. As a result, the Texans' resent-
ment toward Mexico increased. Finally, in 1835 
the Texans overran a Mexican garrison and 
declared themselves the Lone Star Republic. 
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna (a creole who had 
previously helped to overthrow of Iturbide) led 
an army of 6,000 to suppress the revolt of the 
Americans and restore the province to Mexican 
control. He savagely killed the whole Texan force 
at El Alamo in San Antonio. Determined to 
retaliate, the U.S. sent a Texas force led by Sam 
Houston in 1836 to capture Santa Anna. They 
defeated the surprised Mexican army, attacking 
to the cry "Remember the Alamo!" and took 
Santa Anna prisoner. In exchange for his life, 
Santa Anna recognized Texas' independence and 
signed the Velasco Agreement, which promised 
to keep Mexican troops south of the Rio Grande. 
(Riding, p. 36) This was the first in a series of 
humiliating encounters with the United States 
that would wound Mexican feelings. 
On March 1, 1845, the United States 
annexed the Republic of Texas and set the stage 
for a major conflict with Mexico. (Bazant, p. 55) 
Since Mexico held the northern territories of 
Texas, New Mexico, and California, it assumed 
it would win any forthcoming battles with the 
United States. The U.S. invaded and took con-
trol of New Mexico, California, and the north-
ern states of the present republic, but Mexico 
refused to capitulate without a battle. Winfield 
Scott landed at Veracruz with an army of 10,000 
men in 1847. The Mexicans did not contest the 
landing, however, and Scott quickly fought his 
way to Mexico City and seized the capital. 
(Millet and Maslowski, p. 47) On February 2, 
1848, a peace treaty was signed. Mexico lost 
Texas, New Mexico, and California, an area 
equivalent to half of its territory. 
This devastating loss inflicted tremendous 
pain on Mexico, which is still a part of public 
memory. The loss of these territories has given 
rise to Mexican nationalism in four crucial 
ways. (Turner, p. 38) First, it provided a for-
eign foe against which the Mexicans could join 
in opposition. Second, it provided Mexico with 
a permanent focus for its xenophobia. Third, it 
deprived Mexico of the opportunity to incorpo-
rate the territories into a national unit. Finally, 
it provided Mexico with a recognition that 
national unity was essential. 
Modernization of Mexico 
Porfirio Diaz assumed control of Mexico in 
1876. By this time Mexico had a long list of for-
eign debts, its credit rating abroad was 
appalling, and its politics were considered fraud-
ulent throughout Europe. Diaz believed that if 
Mexico were to progress, it had to change its 
image drastically and remove the stigma previ-
ously attached to Mexican politics. Money from 
foreign investors would be forthcoming only if 
Mexico could convince them that it was a sta-
ble nation. He believed that if he first estab-
lished the rule of law, other benefits would fol-
low. Consequently, Diaz was not hesitant in 
using force against rebels to ensure law and 
order. His administration attacked the age-old 
problem of smuggling in Mexico in order to pre-
vent the loss of import and export duties. Diaz 
announced a new, tough government policy 
which punished those individuals and corpora-
tions who tried to circumvent the payment of 
duties by smuggling. (Meyer and Sherman, p. 
435) He reduced his own salary and eliminat-
ed thousands of useless bureaucrats from the 
payrolls. Soon foreign investors began to feel 
that Mexico was safer for them and their money. 
Under Diaz's reign, Mexico entered a peri-
od of tremendous economic growth. Steam, 
water, and electric power began to replace the 
work of animals. Telephones and wireless tele-
graph cables were installed to the amazement 
of many peasants. Additionally, during the 
1880s and 1890s, the duties on many imports 
were lowered for economically depressed areas 
of Mexico. Loans were renegotiated at favorable 
rates and the country shifted from the silver to 
the gold standard. (Meyer and Sherman, p. 441) 
The Epic Revolution in Mexico, whose 
most active phases were between 1910 and 
1917, was in part caused by a new sense of 
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Mexican nationalism and by a desire to rid the 
country of Diaz's control. The foreign investors 
brought in by Diaz were despised by the 
Mexican people who were growing restless with 
the uneven distribution of wealth. Despite the 
gains in the industrial and commercial fields, 
Diaz's economic surplus generated by the mod-
ernized economy was only shared by a few. 
Elections were considered a farce, and freedom 
of the press did not exist. New ideological cur-
rents began sweeping through Mexico which 
denounced such social malaise and ultimately 
helped in ending Diaz's reign. 
Rebel bands who where dissatisfied with 
the Diaz government began attacking govern-
ment forces in Chihuahua. Eventually, these 
rebellious groups grew into a large army as gov-
ernment forces defected to the rebel cause. 
Diaz, sensing his ultimate defeat, boarded a 
train in 1911 for exile in France. The human 
and material destruction escalated after Diaz's 
fall when Emiliano Zapata and other rebel lead-
ers brutally fought for power. The bloody rev-
olution which followed created an impetus to 
national unity and a harmonizing of opposing 
interests. (Turner, 1969) Such heroes as 
Francisco Villa, Zapata, and Alvaro Obregon 
were born out of these battles. They helped 
those Mexicans without any national identifi-
cation develop a new sense of nationalism. 
Repeated outbursts of xenophobia (such as the 
violence shown toward "whites") also helped to 
solidify the self-consciousness of the Mexican 
community at this time. (Quirk, 1962) 
Mexico's Turbulent Relations with 
the United States 
Relations across the Rio Grande were tur-
bulent in the early 1900s. However, relations 
between the two countries began to improve in 
the 1920s when the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, 
Dwight Morrow, and the Mexican president, 
Plutarco Calles, worked together to solve the 
problems between the two countries. Later, 
Franklin Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy" 
marked another change in the overall relation-
ship. In fact, when Mexico nationalized its oil 
fields in 1938 and established Pemex, the 
national oil company, Roosevelt refused to 
acquiesce to American oil company pressure 
and intervene with force. Pemex has remained 
a symbol of national sovereignty. 
In an effort to show its independence from 
any foreign power, Mexico, under President 
Cardenas, established a policy of import sub-
stitution in the 1930s as a means of industrial-
ization. The policy restricted foreign investment 
and controlled the exchange rate in hopes of 
promoting domestic growth. This policy 
remained in effect until the devastating eco-
nomic crisis of the 1980s forced President 
Miguel de la Madrid to open and modernize the 
Mexican economy. He replaced import substi-
tution policies with policies aimed at attracting 
foreign investment. (CRS Report, p. 12) Mexico 
joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1986, assuring that future 
trade liberalization measures and closer ties 
with the U.S. would develop. 
Establishing Trade Policies 
In an effort to further develop economic 
relations with the United States, Mexico estab-
lished the first agreement on bilateral trade 
with the U.S. in November of 1987. (CRS 
Report, p. 12) The agreement provided a 
framework for the removal of trade barriers and 
tariffs and served as a guideline for future dis-
cussions on trade issues. Using this agenda, the 
two countries liberalized trade in steel, textiles, 
and alcoholic beverages. In October 1989 
another trade agreement established a negoti-
ating process for expanding trade and invest-
ment opportunities. Other improvements in 
trade relations have followed, indicating the 
dramatic changes between the two countries. 
Finally, in 1990 both presidents issued a joint 
statement in support of a NAFTA. 
How will such an agreement affect Mexico 
and its strong nationalist beliefs? The Mexican 
government maintains that a free-trade agree-
ment will diminish some of the negative stereo-
types held on southern side of the Rio Grande, 
increase the demand for labor and add to the 
incomes of Mexico's workers. Consumers will 
benefit from lower prices, and the productivity 
of the nation's industries will increase. 
Moreover, the competitiveness of Mexico in 
international markets will dramatically 
improve. 
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The NAFTA also promises to draw new 
capital from Europe, Asia, and North America 
into Mexico. This capital will raise people's liv-
ing standards and narrow the gap between 
Mexican wages and those paid across the bor-
der. By raising the annual economic growth by 
another one or two percent, it will provide the 
government with a large cushion to continue 
structural changes in the economy. The end of 
import tariffs will also help bring down the dou-
ble- and triple-digit inflation that has afflicted 
Mexico for a decade. 
Increased opportunities within Mexico will 
promote a more positive self-image and, con-
sequently, an increased sense of nationalism. 
President Salinas calls this the "new national-
ism" of Mexico. (Inter Press Service, 1991) He 
foresees a series of profound changes which will 
not provoke conflicts with the old sense of 
nationalism. Salinas views the new national-
ism as democratic, active, tolerant to foreign-
ers, and productive. "It defends liberty and pro-
motes justice in the national interest," as 
Salinas has declared. (Inter Press Service, 1991) 
The purpose of the new nationalism is to 
strengthen the Mexican nation while still main-
taining and preserving the traditions, values, 
and cultural history that has made Mexico what 
it is today. In his annual message (1992) to the 
Mexican Congress, Salinas has warned his 
country against being isolationist which he 
views as destructive. 
If Mexico wants to compete in the inter-
dependent world of today, Salinas argues, it 
must open its doors to external influences. 
With a more outward-looking policy, Mexico 
will be able to strengthen its ties with the finan-
cial, scientific, and technological centers of the 
world. Despite Salinas' desire to open up his 
country to external influences, however, Mexico 
is still hesitant to open its petroleum and bank-
ing industries to U.S. investment. Mexico's 
nationalistic sentiments oppose foreign invest-
ment in these two industries. (CRS Report, 
p. 29) Because the Epic Revolution of 1910 was 
in part fought over the role of foreign invest-
ment, Mexico's constitution prohibits foreign 
investment in natural resources, including oil. 
Since President Cardenas nationalized the oil 
industry in 1938, oil can only be understood in 
light of Mexico's endless struggle for indepen-
dence. (Pastor and Castaneda, p. 99) This nat-
ural treasure has been inseparable from 
Mexico's concept of nationalism. To the 
Mexican people, opening up their oil industry 
would be violating their sense of national pride 
and self-respect. The nationalistic cry of "El 
petroleo es nuestro!"- "The oil is ours!"- seems 
to exemplify the allegiance most Mexicans have 
for their petroleum. 
In the early 1970s, large petroleum dis-
coveries were made in southeastern Mexico; and 
soon Mexico became the world's fourth largest 
producer of oil. This newfound petroleum 
wealth has had a drastic impact on how the 
country views itself and its relation to the rest 
of the world. Petroleum production has 
brought Mexico prestige, which in turn is being 
used as a tool in relations with the United 
States. Mexico now carries a new sense of self-
assurance into the international arena and, sub-
sequently, wields a much larger stick in export 
trading. (Meyer and Sherman, p. 681) 
Why then is Mexico considering a NAFTA 
which will permit foreign investment in Pemex, 
Mexico's cherished company? If Salinas con-
tinues to strengthen the structural reforms he 
began in the 1980s, Mexico's economy will 
become increasingly involved in the interna-
tional market. This can only happen if Mexico 
unlocks its hold on Pemex. Without a free trade 
agreement and the subsequent investments, 
Mexico will continue to struggle international-
ly. However, the United State's government and 
foreign investors are determined to appropri-
ate some of the wealth associated with the 
Mexican petroleum industry. They will be hes-
itant to enter into an agreement which prevents 
foreign investment in Pemex. 
The importance of the U.S. to Mexico is 
overwhelming. In 1986, U.S. firms supplied 
70.4 percent of Mexico's imports while buying 
76.6 percent of Mexico's exports. The 
maquiladora industries generated almost 
300,00 jobs in Mexico and added $1.5 billion to 
the value of manufactured goods destined for 
the United States. (Grayson, p. 158) 
Although the bilateral relationship 
between the U.S. and Mexico is strikingly 
unequal since it is between a superpower and a 
developing country, Mexico's importance to the 
U.S. should be noted. In 1986, Mexico was the 
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United States' fourth leading trade partner. 
Sales to Mexico generated 500,000 jobs for 
North American workers. In addition, Pemex 
was the largest single contributor to the U.S. 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. (Grayson, p. 159) 
Permitting foreign investment in Pemex will 
bring tremendous economic benefits to Mexico. 
Like Mexico's petroleum industry, the 
Mexican banking system was nationalized in 
September of 1982. (Riding, p. 68) And like the 
petroleum industry, the banking industry is 
seen as a symbol of patriotism that keeps alive 
a sense of nationhood. Mexicans do not want 
to expose themselves to foreign investment in 
its banks and risk losing this precious national 
"emblem." Consequently, Mexico must decide 
whether the money and jobs that foreign invest-
ment will bring will outweigh the loss of its 
nationalized banking network. 
The Effects of NAFTA on Mexican 
Nationalism 
Sharing a 2,000-mile border with the 
United States has been difficult for Mexicans. 
As President Salinas has said, "It is not easy to 
have a neighbor in the U.S." (Dodwell, 1992) 
Mexicans still resent the U.S. for taking so 
much of its territory, for Washington's frequent 
meddling in their affairs, and for the growing 
American cultural penetration. Mexico dis-
trusts and fears its powerful neighbor. It 
depends on the U.S. but dislikes relying on it. 
This feeling is evident in a local saying: "What 
would we do without the gringos? But we must 
never give them thanks." (Riding, p. 317) Such 
a relationship fosters anti-American senti-
ments, and from this a sense of nationalism 
emerges. Both help the Mexicans guard their 
pride against aggressive attacks by the 
Americans. However, this does not negate the 
reality that Mexico needs to maintain good rela-
tions with the United States. Mexico would not 
be capable of facing the consequences of alien-
ation from Washington. Its economy is too 
unstable and its infrastructure is too weak to 
enable it to become part of the First World on 
its own. 
Despite the increased jobs the treaty will 
bring and the newfound membership in the 
worldwide market, not all Mexicans favor the 
agreement. Some still worry about the threat 
to their culture from hamburgers and Coca-
Cola as more U.S. businesses set up their fac-
tories in Mexico. Mexican author Guadalupe 
Loaeza is one such opponent of the NAFTA. He 
believes that in ten years the Mexican identity 
will be one composed of English slang words 
and Bart Simpson key rings. (Miller, p. 1) He 
looks at how English is eating into the Spanish 
language. Instead of saying adios, people are 
saying goodbye. This, he notes, destroys the 
Mexican identity. 
Other Mexicans claim that the Mexican 
sense of nationalism will not be destroyed nor 
even injured with a NAFTA. With or without 
free trade, the Americanization of Mexico will 
continue. Immigration, a shared border, and 
mass communication all make cultural cross-
pollination inevitable. The change has been 
going on for decades, according to author 
Carlos Monsivais. (Miller, p. 1). Furthermore, 
according to novelist Hector Aguilar Camin: 
Cultures are enriched in their con-
tact with each other. This is going to 
be a different Mexico from that of the 
1940s, but I find it hard to believe it's 
going to be a Mexico of Americans, 
rednecks, and WASPS. Mexicans 
may like American chocolate and 
rock and read Fitzgerald, but they are 
still Mexican. (Miller, p. 1). 
What is happening, these NAFTA support-
ers argue, is not that Mexican culture is becom-
ing Americanized, but that Mexico is becoming 
modernized. This would indicate that Mexicans 
are adopting values held by people from all over 
the globe, not just in the United States. 
As Mexico struggles with many problems 
from the past and those of the present, its 
inhabitants look to the future with some hesi-
tancy. How Mexican society responds to the 
dramatic forthcoming changes caused by 
NAFTA is of vital importance. The true strength 
of Mexico lies within its people who hold their 
customs and sense of nationalism close to their 
hearts. 
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